Border Securitization and its Ramifications for Venezuelan Refugees

Although migration is internationally recognized as an age-old human phenomenon, conservative global narratives equate human migration with insecurity—problematically leading to restricted asylum access, externalized border controls, and the criminalization of human movement. While border securitization measures are most frequently cited in conjunction with states like the US, EU, or Australia, similar strategies are employed internationally. For instance, in response to Venezuela’s refugee crisis, the steady stream of displaced people has caused Venezuela’s neighbors to assert nativist rhetoric, reduce avenues for asylum and protection, and close border crossing routes.

The exodus of Venezuelan refugees is the biggest crisis in the hemisphere and their reception in receiving countries mirrors the protracted crises in other areas of the world, whereby neighboring states’ border controls and deterrence techniques problematically exacerbate migrant marginalization. Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst human rights crises in its history. In the past five years, the country’s economy was halved and hyperinflation soared to one million percent. At least eighty-seven percent of the population lives in poverty and the shortage of public goods, like food and medicine has created a public health emergency: seventy-five percent of Venezuelans have lost 11kg in bodyweight and the under-5 mortality rivals that of Syria. Meanwhile, elevated rates of crime produce persistent vulnerability, and citizens face arbitrary arrest, prosecution by military courts, torture, and a range of other government abuses. Correspondingly, Venezuelan migrants’ push factors encompass widespread corruption and violence, starvation and malnutrition, a lack of social services and healthcare, and more. The dire violation of basic human rights has led Peru, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Paraguay to accuse Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro of crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court.

Escalating desperation and deprivation have forced over two million Venezuelans to seek refuge in adjacent states, the largest exodus of its kind in recent Latin American history. By some counts, more than seven percent of the population has left Venezuela since 2015. In early 2018, arrivals in neighboring countries reached 5,000 per day, building toward a “crisis moment” analogous to the 2015 Mediterranean crisis.

Problematically, marginalized migrants face intensifying manifestations of hostility and xenophobia in receiving communities. Even though the Cartagena Declaration defines refugees as people fleeing “massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order,” some South American governments have introduced a patchwork of policy responses that are designed to deter Venezuelans from arriving. In an effort to constrain the influx of migrants, new passport and visa requirements have been implemented in Chile, Peru, Panama, and Ecuador. Similarly, only valid visa holders are granted entry to Colombia. This hurdle intends to curtail Venezuelan mobility, as the processing time for a Venezuelan passport may take two years.

In theory, stricter entry regulations decrease border crossings. Albeit, while the official record of crossings declines, the total number of entries remain relatively unchanged. In practice, border restrictions simply drive migrants towards more treacherous, clandestine routes. In Colombia, the unofficial trochas (trails) used by smugglers and migrants are controlled by dangerous paramilitary and guerilla organizations. This costly journey exposes migrants to exploitation, violence, and discrimination; women and children in particular are vulnerable to robbery, recruitment tactics, and sexual abuse. On the trochas, the asylum seeker does not just confront illegal armed groups but equally hazardous terrain like mountainous trekking for 1,400km, with nightly temperatures as low as -15° Celsius. Thus, border control measures can be understood produce an unnecessary human toll by inserting already oppressed migrants into situations of greater vulnerability. Holistically, border securitization works less for deterrence purposes and more for the purpose of placating domestic populations by illustrating that political action is being taken for their security.

Many of the asylum seekers who arrive safely in adjacent countries endure in a precarious, irregular situation. A legal or illegal status directly shapes the rights a migrant has access to, and given their unauthorized status, Venezuelans are typically viewed as illegitimate rights claimants. Without proper documentation, Venezuelan migrants’ employment opportunities exist primarily in the informal sector, an existence that lacks welfare security and predictability. This perpetual state of instability leaves Venezuelan migrants on the streets, working for insufficient pay in dangerous industries like prostitution. Nonetheless, the Migration Policy Institute suggests there is no reason to believe the number of Venezuelan migrants will taper in the immediate future, in part because the humanitarian crisis that has displaced so many from their homes shows no sign of abating.

It is possible to distinguish one clear area for reform in the asylum process. The start of a long-term solution to mass displacement demands that human agency and dignity are respected, which coincides with legal authorization to live and work. Rather than narrowing migrant options to risky, clandestine journeys, greater attention must be paid toward legal migration routes. Several South American countries have already formulated unique legal pathways to address the surge in Venezuelan immigration. For example, Peru, Columbia, and Brazil created special permits for temporary residency that grant the rights to work and study. Yet, a significant administrative backlog prevents the timely processing of most claims.

Other countries effectively utilize pre-existing immigration channels. Mexico for instance granted refugee status to ninety-nine percent of Venezuelan asylum applicants in 2017. But, Mexico confronts a similar application processing backlog.

Accordingly, to better address the humanitarian crisis, one feasible adjustment entails increasing the number of administrative personnel in receiving countries. Expediting pathways of legal migration prevents migrants from a lengthy, exploitative traverse. Furthermore, it allows migrants to live with autonomy upon arrival, no longer dependent on the precarious informal sector. Such a minute adjustment cannot ease the tide of the greater exodus, but at least until Maduro loses his grip on power, cumulative small steps, amidst greater multinational humanitarian and development initiatives, offer a glimmer of hope to many Venezuelans.